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With the end of the Cold War, in a dramatically changed security environment, the advances in 
nonnuclear strategic capabilities along with reduced numbers and roles for nuclear forces have 
altered the calculus of deterrence and defense, at least for the United States. For many, this has 
opened up a realistic possibility of a nuclear-weapon-free world. 
It soon became clear that the initial post-Cold War hopes were exaggerated. The world did 
change fundamentally, but it did not become more secure and stable. In place of the old Soviet 
threat, there has been growing concern about proliferation and terrorism involving nuclear and 
other weapons of mass destruction (WMD), regional conflicts, global instability and increasingly 
serious new and emerging threats, including cyber attacks and attacks on satellites. 
For the United States at least, in this emerging environment, the political rationales for nuclear 
weapons, from deterrence to reassurance to alliance management, are changing and less central 
than during the Cold War to the security of the United States—and its friends and allies. Nuclear 
weapons remain important for the United States, but for a far more limited set of roles and 
missions. As the Perry-Schlesinger Commission report reveals, there is a domestic U.S. 
consensus on nuclear policy and posture at the highest level and for the near term, including the 
continued role of nuclear arms in deterring WMD use and in reassuring allies. 
Although the value of nuclear weapons has declined for the United States, the value of these 
weapons for Russia, China and so-called “rogue” states is seen to be rising. The nuclear logic of 
NATO during Cold War—the need for nuclear weapons to counter the vastly superior 
conventional capabilities of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact—is today heard from 
Russians and even some proliferants. Moreover, these weapons present a way for rogues to 
achieve regional hegemony and possibly to deter interventions by the United States or others. 
While the vision of a nuclear-weapon-free world is powerful, both existing nuclear powers and 
proliferators are unlikely to forego nuclear weapons entirely in a world that is dangerous and 
uncertain. Moreover, the emerging world would not necessarily be more secure and stable 
without nuclear weapons. Even if nuclear weapons were given up by the United States and other 
nuclear-weapon states, there would continue to be concerns about the proliferation of nuclear, 
chemical and biological weapons, which would not disappear and could worsen. WMD terrorism 
would remain a concern that would be largely unaffected by U.S. and other nuclear-weapon-state 
decisions. Conventional capabilities would not disappear and the prospects of warfare could rise. 
In addition, new problems could arise if rogue states or other non-status-quo powers attempted to 
take advantage of moves toward nuclear disarmament, while friends and allies who are not 
reassured as in the past could reconsider their options if the credibility of extended deterrence 
declined. 
To address these challenges, non- and counter-proliferation and counterterrorism—including 
defenses and consequence management—are priorities, especially in light of an anticipated 
“renaissance” in civil nuclear power. The current agenda of the United States and others includes 
efforts to: 
• Strengthen the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its safeguards 
system;  
• Strengthen export controls, especially for sensitive technologies, by limiting the 
development of reprocessing and enrichment technologies and by requiring the 
Additional Protocol as a condition of supply;  
• Establish a reliable supply regime, including the possibility of multilateral or 
multinational ownership of fuel cycle facilities, as a means to promote peaceful 
uses of nuclear energy without increasing the risks of proliferation or terrorism;  
• Implement effectively UN Security Council Resolution 1540; and  
• Strengthen and institutionalize the Proliferation Security Initiative and the Global 
Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism. 
These and other activities are important in themselves, and they are essential to maintaining and 
strengthening the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) bargain by bolstering two of its pillars—
nonproliferation and peaceful nuclear energy cooperation. There is no alternative and little 
prospect for a better deal. 
The need to strengthen the NPT bargain today also requires renewed political attention to nuclear 
disarmament, the third pillar of the treaty. There is, of course, no direct linkage between the 
nuclear arms of the United States or those of another NPT-recognized nuclear-weapon state and 
the emergence of proliferation threats. Moreover, any assertion of a link between disarmament 
efforts and nonproliferation cooperation is unsupported by the evidence and questionable. 
Nonetheless, the political requirement for moves towards disarmament in the NPT context is 
indisputable.[1] This may not have been the understanding of the negotiators of the treaty, but it 
is today’s political reality. 
The security environment that highlights the importance of nonproliferation, arms control and 
disarmament also points to the continuing need for deterrence and its extension to friends and 
allies. What are the relations between extended deterrence, arms control and disarmament, and 
nonproliferation? 
In October 2008, U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates highlighted the continuing need for 
nuclear weapons in the emerging security environment for the United States as well as its friends 
and allies. He stated that proposals for the elimination of nuclear weapons “have come up against 
the reality that as long as others have nuclear weapons, we must maintain some level of these 
weapons ourselves to deter potential adversaries and to reassure over two dozen allies and 
partners who rely on our nuclear umbrella for their security, making it unnecessary for them to 
develop their own.”[2] He recognized that some argue that there is no “real nuclear threat” to the 
United States, but highlighted the fact that “our friends and allies perceive different levels of risk 
within their respective regions. Here our arsenal plays an irreplaceable role in reducing 
proliferation.”[3] 
Even though these remarks were made when Secretary Gates was serving in the Bush 
Administration, they are fully consistent with those espoused by President Obama in Prague, 
though different in emphasis and tone. 
President Obama reiterated the pledge of the United States to defend the Czech Republic and its 
other NATO allies. He stated: “I am here to say that the United States will never turn its back on 
the people of this nation. … We are bound by shared values and shared history and the enduring 
promise of our alliance. NATO's Article V states it clearly: An attack on one is an attack on all. 
That is a promise for our time, and for all time.”[4] It was in this context that he spoke of 
“America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons.”[5] 
He recognized that this objective “will not be reached quickly—perhaps not in my lifetime. It will 
take patience and persistence. But now we, too, must ignore the voices who tell us that the world 
cannot change.” [6] 
As he began to outline “concrete” steps, he stated: “To put an end to Cold War thinking, we will 
reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, and urge others to do the 
same. Make no mistake: As long as these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, 
secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defense to our allies -- 
including the Czech Republic. But we will begin the work of reducing our arsenal.”[7] 
The direct, concrete steps to which he committed as this “beginning” include a Strategic Arms 
Reductions Treaty (START) follow-on, ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 
and negotiation of a verifiable Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty (FMCT). He stated: 
To reduce our warheads and stockpiles, we will negotiate a new Strategic Arms 
Reduction Treaty with the Russians this year. President Medvedev and I began this 
process in London, and will seek a new agreement by the end of this year that is 
legally binding and sufficiently bold. And this will set the stage for further cuts, and 
we will seek to include all nuclear weapons states in this endeavor. 
To achieve a global ban on nuclear testing, my administration will immediately and aggressively 
pursue U.S. ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. After more than five decades of 
talks, it is time for the testing of nuclear weapons to finally be banned. 
And to cut off the building blocks needed for a bomb, the United States will seek a new treaty that 
verifiably ends the production of fissile materials intended for use in state nuclear weapons. If we 
are serious about stopping the spread of these weapons, then we should put an end to the 
dedicated production of weapons-grade materials that create them.[8] 
Other proposals put forward in Prague included strengthening the NPT and other nonproliferation 
regimes, as well as counterproliferation and counterterrorism initiatives. 
There has been some anxiety from some U.S. allies under the nuclear umbrella about the interest 
in a world free of nuclear weapons. There is also widespread support for the goal on political and 
security grounds. 
It seems clear that like George Schultz, Henry Kissinger, William Perry, and Sam Nunn, whose 
proposals inspired him, the president is offering a bold vision that is to be pursued, at least at the 
outset, with incremental, practical steps. Each of these steps was U.S. policy in the Bush or the 
Clinton Administration, or in both. The specific proposals of the Obama Administration cannot be 
fully discussed without raising the critical issues that have dominated the nuclear disarmament 
debate since the dawn of the nuclear age. The program does not amount to a call for a Nuclear 
Weapon Convention or agreement on outlawing nuclear weapons, or for renouncing deterrence. 
Indeed, achieving the steps proposed would not appear to threaten nuclear deterrence or its 
extension to allies and friends, which were reaffirmed in the call for a nuclear-weapon-free world. 
As reassurance requires addressing the security concerns of allies, to the extent that Russian 
and possibly other nuclear arsenals are drawn down, and especially if Russian non-strategic 
nuclear forces are addressed, the proposed steps would reduce at least some of the nuclear 
threats that confront the NATO alliance and thereby enhance its security. A positive turn in U.S.-
Russian and NATO-Russian relations would also provide security benefits. 
Several policy questions that might adversely affect extended deterrence could come into play in 
the near to medium term. The first involves the related issues of non-strategic nuclear forces and 
the presence of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. Will U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe be 
maintained and modernized? If not, how and in what context might they be removed? What would 
be the impact on extended deterrence? What is to be done about Russian non-strategic forces? 
Will they be addressed in strategic reductions negotiations? Or will they be handled in separate 
negotiations with the United States, with U.S. weapons in Europe on the table? 
U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe have been central to the credibility of extended deterrence and 
burden sharing. In the last decade, however, nuclear-sharing arrangements have come under 
criticism in the NPT review process, and some abolitionists have called for the removal of U.S. 
nuclear weapons from Europe as a symbol of decreased dependence on nuclear weapons. The 
president did not raise the issue of U.S. forces in Europe, but Secretary Gates has expressed his 
support for continuing the current arrangements. 
The alliance has undertaken significant unilateral nuclear reductions in the past. In the early 
1990s, the United States and its NATO allies in the context of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives 
(PNIs) unilaterally withdrew all nuclear artillery shells, all nuclear warheads for short-range 
ballistic missiles, and all naval nuclear anti-submarine warfare weapons. These unilateral actions 
reduced non-strategic nuclear forces in NATO by nearly 90 percent, reduced the types of U.S. 
nuclear weapons based in Europe from five to one, and reduced nuclear weapon storage sites in 
Europe by 80 percent. 
Since then, there have been calls for codification of the U.S. and Soviet/Russian PNIs of 1991-
1992 or the further reduction or elimination of nonstrategic nuclear forces in the context of 
strategic reductions or independently. This would involve difficult and complex negotiating issues, 
including scope and verification, especially if warheads are a unit of account. Any negotiations on 
non-strategic forces could have potentially significant effects in that they could make the 
remaining U.S. nuclear arms in Europe central to a contentious bargaining process. Many argue 
that these U.S. weapons should be removed from Europe and eliminated in exchange for 
limitations on Russian nonstrategic nuclear weapons. However, the Russians attribute utility to 
their non-strategic nuclear weapons for reasons other than the U.S. nuclear presence in Europe 
and would not likely consider such a deal, unless it would eliminate the U.S. nuclear weapons 
presence from Europe and leave Moscow with a considerable number of NSNF. Consequently, 
separate negotiations on NSNF do not seem likely. 
U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has made clear that the U.S. commitment to further 
nuclear-weapon reductions includes non-strategic systems. This will not occur in the new START 
treaty to which the United States and Russia have committed themselves to negotiate. NSNF will 
possibly not be included in any immediate follow-on negotiations that may be pursued in its 
aftermath. However, it will be critical to address these weapons at some stage if significant 
additional reductions are to be possible. Doing so in bilateral strategic negotiations seems more 
likely than in separate non-strategic talks. 
If this is correct, it is possible that U.S. forces would not need to be removed from Europe via a 
negotiated agreement. But should this action be undertaken unilaterally? The risks to burden 
sharing and consultations among the allies, and to the transatlantic link in extended deterrence, 
have been raised. In contrast, some have argued that this move would provide significant 
benefits, including demonstrating NATO’s commitment to disarmament, contributing to NPT 
diplomacy and to a successful Review Conference in 2010 or thereafter, strengthening the 
commitment of nonnuclear weapon-states to nonproliferation and influencing Russian NSNF 
deployments. These benefits appear overstated or unrealistic. 
In any case, whether or not to continue the current nuclear-sharing arrangements should be an 
alliance decision, and many who advocate change believe that it should not be undertaken 
precipitously and that it should be preceded by extensive consultations and full coordination 
within the Alliance. Any decision should be taken in a manner that prevents any perceptions of 
transatlantic de-coupling to the maximum extent possible, avoids any sense that the decision was 
driven by external or internal pressures, and maintains the credibility of extended deterrence.[9] 
The second policy question involves ballistic missile defense (BMD), which is increasingly a factor 
in alliance deterrence calculations. The Russian reaction to the decisions by Poland and the 
Czech Republic to host elements of a U.S. BMD system directed at protection against Iran has 
been severe. However, Russia opposes U.S. BMD development globally and will raise the issue 
in the START follow-on negotiations. There have been calls for a new Antiballistic Missile (ABM) 
treaty, and Presidents Obama and Medvedev agreed to look at offense-defense relations. If 
negotiated arrangements are reached, an important issue will be their impact on extended 
deterrence. In this area, there are options consistent with NATO deterrence needs, including 
NATO-Russian cooperation on defenses designed to provide protection against Iran or other 
Middle Eastern threats. 
A third policy question involves conventional capabilities. U.S. conventional force capabilities, 
especially the strategic conventional capabilities referred to by the Bush administration as Prompt 
Global Strike (PGS), are increasingly being singled out as a problem for bilateral U.S.-Russian 
strategic nuclear reductions as well as for the longer term goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world. 
This response to U.S. conventional superiority, at a time when U.S. conventional military 
capabilities will be increasingly relied upon for deterrence and defense of the United States and 
its allies, could be a problem for the Alliance and its efforts to promote nuclear disarmament and 
nonproliferation while maintaining U.S. extended deterrence. Here too the issue will be whether 
negotiated arrangements will be reached and, if so, their impact on extended deterrence. Options 
consistent with NATO deterrence needs are possible, including counting any PGS-type systems 
as nuclear delivery systems under a START follow-on agreement. 
The fourth policy question involves calls for reducing the role of nuclear weapons. Such calls 
have been made in the United States and other NATO countries, and the President referred to 
this in his April 2009 Prague speech. This does not pose a problem at current or foreseeable 
force levels and with a commitment to extended deterrence. When these calls involve moving 
away from nuclear deterrence altogether, as has been demanded by some states and 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), there is a threat to the nuclear umbrella. There is a need 
to ensure that potential adversaries do not view any such efforts as an invitation to threaten the 
alliance. There is also a need for consultations on the meaning and means of extended 
deterrence. In other words, the NATO allies should discuss the desirability and nature of any 
further actions to reduce reliance on nuclear deterrence and assure allies that any actions taken 
remain compatible with their defense and deterrence needs. 
Beyond these issues, none of which need have a negative impact on extended deterrence if 
handled well, at some point along the path to a nuclear-weapon-free world that President Obama 
and others envision, the potential for the direct impact of reduced forces and capabilities on 
extended deterrence would be raised. 
This would involve getting to, or very near, the end point of a nuclear-weapon-free world, 
however, which is difficult to imagine. It may not require a new Eden or even General and 
Complete Disarmament. It may not require, as suggested in the Acheson-Lilienthal report and the 
Baruch plan, an end to war. It would seem, however, to require a fundamental change in the 
relations among states. Progress would be desirable and probably necessary at least in: 
• Reducing further the role of conflict and war in international affairs;  
• Improving regional conflict management;  
• Reducing nonnuclear armaments in some fashion;  
• Strengthening nonproliferation and other threat reduction efforts, and resolving 
outstanding proliferation cases; and  
• Arriving at greater agreement, if not a full consensus, on acceptable verification 
measures and on enforcing compliance—because verification cannot be perfect, and 
the stakes are high. 
Although controversial, there may also be a need for some type of international force or suitable 
military arrangements, as well as cooperation on defenses, both active and passive, to deter and 
respond to breakout scenarios. As noted, these needs raise significant issues themselves. 
It is not clear that we will get to this stage. If we do not, the nuclear disarmament project will not 
be completed and could possibly but not necessarily be reversed. If these conditions are met, 
nuclear disarmament may be possible but it would take decades to achieve. In this event, the 
need for security alliances would not necessarily vanish, but they would likely shift over time to 
global or regional efforts to prevent “breakout.” Extended deterrence requirements would not 
necessarily disappear, but they would certainly be less pressing and perhaps handled in different 
ways with different means. 
What will be critical if we believe reaching this point is possible is the establishment of a step-by-
step process that ensures the security of the United States along with that of its friends and allies 
at every step. This requires full consultations among the allies, their inclusion in broader strategic 
dialogues with the nuclear powers and others, and attention to their security concerns at the 
regional, subregional and national levels at every point in the process. 
Ensuring security requires dealing with current realities as well as future aspirations and 
possibilities. During any transitional period, nonproliferation is essential. As suggested above, 
moves toward nuclear disarmament will not change the nature of global cooperative 
nonproliferation efforts, but they should help efforts within the alliance to maintain a credible 
nuclear policy. They may aid the near-term requirement to modernize NATO’s dual-capable 
aircraft. This is essential. If we do not reach the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world, we will have 
to continue to deter and to reassure. If we are moving toward the goal, nuclear deterrence will still 
be essential during the transition; and it cannot be replaced as has at times been suggested, by 
non-nuclear deterrence or virtual nuclear deterrence. Both may have a role to play, but they are 
highly questionable as substitutes for nuclear deterrence. 
Some hold that conventional deterrence will allow the United States to forego nuclear deterrence, 
at least in most contingencies. Conventional weapons can replace nuclear arms in certain nuclear 
missions and will increasingly figure in future deterrence calculations. However, the historical 
record of conventional deterrence is not encouraging, and the experience of recent years is 
mixed at best. If advanced conventional capabilities are used decisively and successfully in 
battle, they could have a deterrent effect. But they may not achieve operational and deterrence 
success. Moreover, conventional forces sufficient to deter a threat may not be available in a 
region of concern in time to prevent aggression. Even if the United States and its allies could 
accept reliance on U.S. conventional capabilities as a hedge to reduce the risks of disarming, 
other nuclear-weapon states (such as Russia) would not be able to do so. The pursuit of 
conventional deterrence would make disarmament less likely, not more. 
Virtual deterrence also presents problems and uncertainties. It is based on a reality. Virtual 
capabilities would exist in a nuclear–weapon-free world. Shutdown programs could be 
reconstituted; civil nuclear programs could be used, or misused, to make weapons. The implicit 
assumption that one can choose whether or not to rely on virtual capabilities is only partially true. 
Moreover, to argue that they would have a positive deterrent effect without forces in being is not 
persuasive. Capabilities may cast a deterrence “shadow,” but an effective virtual arsenal would 
almost certainly require, among other things, human capital and facilities that cannot just be 
“mothballed” and that will need to be visibly exercised if they are to have any real deterrent value. 
Such exercise activities might appear threatening and could at a minimum raise questions about 
crisis and arms control stability. The acceptance of such a virtual deterrence strategy as a 
complement to nuclear disarmament by non-nuclear-weapon states and NGOs is by no means 
certain. It has been criticized by abolitionists. 
With the calls of President Obama and others for a world without nuclear weapons, there is 
growing interest in, and hopes for, nuclear disarmament in governments and NGOs around the 
world. The path to a nuclear-weapon-free world is difficult to imagine. This has led William Perry 
and others to advocate establishing a “base camp” or reaching a “vantage point” where issues 
will presumably be clearer before critical decisions on nuclear disarmament are taken.[10] The 
political, military and technical feasibility and implications of nuclear disarmament will all need to 
be addressed. Would a world without nuclear weapons be more stable and secure than the 
current international security arrangements? How could this be assured? What are the conditions 
in which nuclear weapons might be eliminated? How would we ensure that nuclear weapons 
were given up? Is the global elimination of nuclear weapons verifiable? How would compliance be 
assured? These and other questions about the path toward and the shape of a nuclear-weapon-
free world are significant, and will all need to be addressed. The challenges are immense and the 
prospects for success are uncertain. 
The pursuit of deterrence, nonproliferation and arms control in the context of a vision of a nuclear-
weapon-free world is possible and probably a political necessity. It will be critical to consult within 
the alliance and to move in a way that does not undermine deterrence, because deterrence offers 
order, stability and nonproliferation benefits along the path and it may even make the pursuit of 
the goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world more realistic. Navigating this path will be difficult, but it 
may result in near-term security benefits and NPT diplomatic successes. 
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